. "Election officials often unfair" is the weighted percentage of respondents in each country, when asked "In your view, how often do the following things occur in this country's elections?", answering "Not at all often" or "Not often" to "Election officials are fair", against the alternatives of "Very often", "Fairly often", or "Don't know/Not answer". "Often violence at polls" is the percentage answering "Very often" or "Fairly often" to "Voters are threatened with violence at the polls." Notes: Column (1) reports OLS estimates from an officer-level regression of a variable taking the 1-4 scale value ("Very unlikely (1)", "Unlikely (2)", "Likely (3)", "Very likely (4)") of the assessed likelihood of the hypothetical individual being allowed to vote on indicator variables for whether the officer's own type matches that of the randomly assigned voter name (Muslim, Yadav, Brahmin), separately by each officer type for which a voter name match was possible. Column (2) reports OLS estimates from a regression with the outcome as an indicator variable taking value 1 if the respondent answers "Very likely" or "Likely" as opposed to "Unlikely" or "Very unlikely" and 0 otherwise. Controls are the same as in Table 6 . Standard errors clustered at the polling station level in parentheses. Notes: Each column reports OLS estimates from an individual-level regression of the listed variable on the mixed team polling station indicator, for the sample of individuals indicated in each column. Additionally included are the same set of controls as in Table 8 , with the exception of the individual-and household-level characteristics, which are not available for individuals who indicated they did not go to the polling station on election day. Standard errors clustered at the polling station level in parentheses. 
Non-sensitive statements
Experiment 1 -Your polling station was located in a government school building.
-There were other polling stations at the same building/location as your polling station.
-You saw campaign posters in your neighborhood before the election.
-One or more of the election officers at your polling station was female. Experiment 2 -You heard political party advertisements on television or radio before the election.
-You stood in line while waiting to vote at your polling station.
-A police/security officer was at your polling station while you were there.
-One or more of the election officers at your polling station was from your village.
Survey sampling

Potential voters survey
Polling stations in urban areas, where locating specific individuals based on the information available in the electoral roll would not have been feasible, were excluded from the sample (8.3 percent of total). Also excluded were polling stations with only three election officers (0.7 percent of total), as were polling stations that were split across a main polling station and an extension station (9.8 percent of total). The publicly available lists of registered voters were at the (main+extension) level, so it was not possible to determine to which of the main station or extension individuals were assigned. The only difference between having a main and extension station versus two polling stations in the same location is whether the threshold for maximum registered voters at a single station was reached after the formal yearly deadline to split polling stations. Administration is otherwise identical. In some locations, fewer than three Muslims or two Yadavs were identified in the list. If too few Muslims were available, Yadavs were randomly drawn to fill the positions when possible, and vice versa. If fewer than five Muslims and Yadavs in total were identified, individuals that were neither Muslim nor Yadav were randomly drawn to fill the position.
Seasonal migration is common in the survey area and the electoral rolls contain errors (e.g. listed individuals may be duplicates or have moved and registered at another polling station without being deleted from the list at the previous station). Therefore, randomly drawn backup respondents were also identified for each primary respondent. In addition, if a located individual indicated that they did not go to the polling station to attempt to vote on election day, the next backup individual was then substituted. In the final sample, 36.6 percent of respondents were from the primary sample, 22.6 percent were the first backup, 14.6 percent were the second backup, 11.2 percent were the third backup, and 15 percent were fourth backup or higher. These rates of replacement are similar to those of other surveys in the region which identified respondents based on the electoral roll (Banerjee et al. 2014) . Neither the rate of consent (>99 percent) among reachable individuals nor the overall proportion of primary versus backup respondents differ significantly by whether the polling station is mixed versus homogeneous team.
Election officers survey
A total of 6,251 officers served at polling stations during the 2014 election in the district in which the survey was conducted. Out of these officers, 6,045 had phone numbers listed in the administrative data which were not obviously incorrect (i.e. having the wrong number of digits or all zero numerals).
Of these 6,045 individuals, 614 officers were inferred as Muslim or Yadav. Each of these individuals was attempted to be reached by phone. One non-Muslim/Yadav officer was randomly selected for calling from each of the mixed composition teams of which the previous 614 Muslim/Yadav officers were a member. If the officer could not be reached or did not consent, another officer of the same type was selected as a replacement, if possible. An additional 600 homogeneous polling teams were randomly chosen, stratifying by sub-constituency, and an officer from within the team was randomly selected. Again, if the officer could not be reached or did not consent, another officer was selected as a replacement, if possible. A total of 2,340 officers were called. In 30 percent of instances the individual was not reachable (in large part due to the listed phone number no longer being functional/up-to-date), and initial non-consent was low (1.4 percent). From the population of mixed team polling stations with an M-Y officer and non-MY officer each confirmed as initially consenting and homogeneous polling stations with an officer confirmed as initially consenting, 305 mixed team and homogeneous polling stations each were randomly selected as described in the main text. The rate of final consent (>98 percent) among reachable individuals in this set of officers does not differ significantly by whether the polling station is mixed versus homogeneous team.
Counterfactual calculation details
The total estimated effect on the RJD-BJP coalition vote share margin of shifting to a mixed composition polling station team is approximated by the sum of the within-station effect and the cross-station spillover effect multiplied by the number of neighbor polling stations, adjusting for the sub-constituency level of voter identity card coverage, ID c . Sub-constituency-level administrative data available for the 2010 and 2014 election cycles across the entire state of Bihar allows me to observe the voter identity card coverage and calculate the average number of polling station neighbors in each sub-constituency, N c . The distribution of neighbors by officer team size is not available outside of the two sample districts. The results of the spatial externality regressions in Section III.B, however, are nearly identical when the overall number of neighbors is used as a control instead of separating by team size. In addition, the neighbor and identity card coverage data were not yet available for the 2015 elections, so the 2014 values are used for that election cycle.
Taking the coefficients from a modified version of equation (3) allowing for cross-station spillover effects, estimated on the sample districts for which I possess officer assignment information,
the impact of a change of magnitude, X, in the proportion of mixed polling stations in a sub-constituency can be estimated as X * [(β + γ * N c ) + (β 2 + γ 2 * N c ) * ID c ]. As the baseline shares of mixed teams outside my sample area are not observed, I assume the proportions are the same as that in the observable sample, 0.324. The value of X needed to change the outcome of the race between the RJD and BJP coalitions can then be calculated using the previous estimate together with the constituency level margins of victory. When calculating impacts at the parliamentary constituency level, I take a weighted average (based on number of polling stations) across the sub-constituencies within each parliamentary constituency.
